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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2009, I published an article which focused on the remarkable lack
of clarity surrounding the term “limited public forum” in the law of freedom
of speech.1 I asserted then:
More than twenty-five years after the United States
Supreme Court, in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, purported to define and elucidate the
components of its “public forum” doctrine, the meaning—and
legal significance—of the “limited public forum” concept remains
startlingly unclear. Confessions of uncertainty by courts as to the
meaning of this term—and its relationship to its doctrinal siblings,
the “designated” public forum and the “non-public forum”—are, in
2
fact, surprisingly common in reported judicial decisions.

“The uncertainty surrounding this body of First Amendment
doctrine,” I concluded, cries out for resolution.3
*
Marc Rohr is a Professor of Law Emeritus at Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad College of Law.
1.
Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33 NOVA
L. REV. 299, 301 (2009).
2.
Id. at 300 (footnote omitted); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–48 (1983).
3.
Rohr, supra note 1, at 355.
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But the clarity for which I hoped has not been provided by the
Supreme Court. Instead, the Court has, since I begged it for clarification in
2009, amplified the confusion associated with its forum categories, to the
point that it is no longer even certain how many such categories there are.4
The modest goal of this Article is simply to try to answer that
question.5
II.

THE ESSENCE OF THE “PUBLIC FORUM” DOCTRINE, PRIOR TO 2009

For the sake of the uninitiated, it should be said, without further
delay, that all of this pertains to the issue of access, for expressive purposes,
to governmentally-controlled properties or channels of communication that
have not traditionally been deemed available to the citizenry for such
purposes.6 Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,7 in 1983,
represented the Supreme Court’s first attempt to impose order on the case
law addressing questions of this kind, which arise continually.8 I
summarized Perry’s well-known taxonomy in my earlier article, as follows:
Justice White set forth, in this [majority] opinion, the
tripartite breakdown of governmental “fora” . . . that continues to
be quoted regularly. The first category, he stated, consists of
“places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate,” embracing—at least—“streets
and parks.” “In these quintessential public forums, he went on to
say, restrictions on expression would be evaluated pursuant to the
tests usually employed to gauge the constitutionality of contentA second
based or content-neutral regulations of speech.9
4.
At least one colleague agrees: “[T]here is not even agreement as to how
many levels of forum exist within the public forum doctrine. . . . It is a bad sign if the doctrine
is so confused that reasonable observers cannot even agree on how many categories of forum
exist.” Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
647, 654 (2010).
5.
See infra Parts II–VII.
6.
Rohr, supra note 1, at 300–01.
7.
460 U.S. 37 (1983).
8.
See id. at 43–44, 43 n.6, 46.
9.
As Justice White explained, at this point:
For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end. The State may also enforce
regulations of the time, place, and manner of expression, which are
content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (citation omitted). I will refer to these tests as
“the higher levels of scrutiny.”
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category, he continued, “consists of public property which the
State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity . . . . This second category is important because, [as]
Justice White instructed us, the First Amendment “forbids a State
to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the
public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first
place.” At this point a key point was made in a footnote: “A
public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by
certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain subjects.” A
significant caveat was added: “Although a State is not required to
indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it
does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional
public forum”—thus introducing the term “traditional public
forum” to describe the first category in this taxonomy. 10
Finally, he addressed the third category, described simply
as “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication.” In such locations, . . . “the
State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Oddly, it was not
until later in his opinion that Justice White gave this third type of
governmental property a name, and he did so only in passing: . . .
“Implicit in the concept of the non-public forum,” he wrote, “is the
right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter
11
and speaker identity.”

At that point in my earlier article, still discussing Justice White’s
opinion in Perry, I began my critique:
But with respect to the concept of the “limited” public
forum, the opinion was distinctly unhelpful. First, as with the term
“non-public forum,” Justice White used the term “limited public
forum” only in passing, never defining it . . . ; readers of the
opinion were thus left to infer that the “limited public forum” was
the aforementioned forum “created for a limited purpose such as
use by certain groups . . . or for the discussion of certain subjects.”
Second, and most inexcusably, the legal significance of
the label was never made explicit in Justice White’s opinion. He
stated that the designated public forum would be treated as if it
were a traditional public forum, but said nothing, in general terms,
as to how the constitutionality of an exclusion of a particular

10.
11.
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speaker from a designated public forum limited for “use by certain
12
groups” would be assessed.

I argued then—based on what I deemed to be clues lurking in the
remainder of Justice White’s Perry opinion,13 along with the Court’s earlier
ruling in Widmar v. Vincent14—that this was the proper understanding of the
legal significance of the limited public forum concept:
In a limited public forum, we must first identify the speakers to
whom the forum has been opened—the favored class of speakers,
if you will—and then ask whether the speaker who seeks access to
the forum—the challenger—is an “entit[y] of similar character” to
those to whom the forum has been opened. In other words, we
must ask whether the challenger falls within the favored class of
speakers. If the answer is “yes,” then that challenger enjoys a
“right of access” to the forum. To put it another way, a limited
public forum would be “open” to speakers who fall into the same
class as those to whom the forum has already been opened. . . . So
it would appear, from the totality of the Perry decision, that a
limited public forum will be treated as either a traditional public
forum or a non-public forum, depending on whether the challenger
15
does or does not fall within the favored class of speakers.

To my knowledge, this was the only understanding of the limited
public forum concept that gave it real meaning, as a category distinct from
all the others.16 And I was not alone in drawing this inference from Perry
and Widmar; along with dictum in 1992’s International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee17 decision,18 several federal appellate courts
embraced the same approach.19
12.

Rohr, supra note 1, at 306; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7,

47–48.
13.
Rohr, supra note 1, at 306–08; see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46
n.7, 47–48.
14.
454 U.S. 263 (1981).
15.
Rohr, supra note 1, at 307–08 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted);
see also Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7, 47–48; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269–70.
16.
Rohr, supra note 1, at 306–09.
17.
505 U.S. 672 (1992).
18.
Id. at 678–79.
19.
See Rohr, supra note 1, at 332–34. Remarkably, this theory has continued
to be put forth by one of those courts of appeals, albeit inconsistently and in dictum. See
Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 340 (2d Cir.), reh’g granted, 611 F. App’x
741 (2d Cir. 2015); Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 613 F.3d 336, 342 (2d Cir.
2010) (per curiam). But see Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 36 (2d
Cir. 2011); Ochshorn ex rel. R.O. v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645 F.3d 533, 540 (2d Cir. 2011).
I say “remarkably” because this understanding was pretty clearly repudiated by the Supreme
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But the actual holding of Perry,20 along with the Court’s other public
forum cases decided between 1985 and 1998,21 provided little or no support
for that theory.22 Then, in 2001, in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School,23 the Court, speaking through Justice Thomas, administered the coup
de grace:
When the State establishes a limited public forum, the
State is not required to and does not allow persons to engage in
every type of speech. The State may be justified “in reserving [its
forum] for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”
The State’s power to restrict speech, however, is not without
limits. The restriction must not discriminate against speech on the
basis of viewpoint, and the restriction must be “reasonable in light
24
of the purpose served by the forum.”

Intentionally or not, Justice Thomas thereby equated, for purposes of
First Amendment analysis, the category of the limited public forum with that
of the non-public forum—with no explanation, or even any explicit
acknowledgment, whatsoever, that he was doing so.25 But, of course, lower
courts took the hint.26 Writing in 2009, I concluded:
The federal courts of appeals remain strikingly divided
with respect to their understanding of what it means to pin the

Court in 2001. Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011); infra text
accompanying notes 18–19.
20.
See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 55; Rohr, supra note 1, at 309–12.
21.
See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669 (1998);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 724 (1990); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 796 (1985). Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Forbes, however, did arguably
lend some support to the limited public forum theory which I have advocated, but too
ambiguously to cite, with any confidence, as supportive thereof. See Rohr, supra note 1, at
320–25.
22.
See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 55.
23.
533 U.S. 98 (2001).
24.
Id. at 106–07 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
25.
Rohr, supra note 1 at 320; see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102,
106, 120, 131. That important doctrinal development had been strongly implied, six years
earlier, by Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995). I criticized the Rosenberger
pronouncement as well. Rohr, supra note 1, at 325; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–
30. With regard to both decisions, I pointed out that, because each of them found
impermissible viewpoint discrimination, no categorizing of the relevant forum was even
necessary. Rohr, supra note 1, at 325; see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–07;
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–30.
26.
See Rohr, supra note 1 at 332.
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label “limited public forum” upon a governmentally controlled
property or channel of communication. At the risk of oversimplification, these courts can essentially be placed into one of
two groups: Those who, like your humble author, are guided by
the implications of Perry and Forbes, and those who have been
influenced primarily by the misleading statements made in the
Rosenberger [v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia] and
27
Good News Club decisions.

III.

SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT PRONOUNCEMENTS

As unhelpful as the Court was, in cases prior to 2009, in elucidating
its public forum doctrine, it did, at least, faithfully list the three dominant
categories of First Amendment fora: traditional, designated, and “non.”28
That changed in 2009, in Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum.29 Because the Court found the Ten Commandments
monument at issue therein to be, in the context of the case, a species of
government speech,30 Justice Alito’s discussion of public forum principles
was entirely dictum; nonetheless, any statement made in a Supreme Court
majority opinion obviously carries weight. So what did he say that has
influenced the presentation of public forum concepts in lower courts? He
listed the categories of traditional and designated public fora, and then added
this: “The Court has also held that a government entity may create a forum
that is limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion
of certain subjects. In such a forum, a government entity may impose
restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.”31
For the first time, the non-public forum received no mention.32
While Alito did not use the term “limited public forum,” had he effectively
replaced the non-public forum category with the limited public forum
category? The Court had already—in dictum in Good News Club—equated
those two categories for analytical purposes, but were we now supposed to
conflate them completely—despite the fact that some “non-public” fora are
27.
Id.; see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120; Ark. Educ. Television
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 846; Perry Educ.
Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 55.
28.
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990); Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
29.
555 U.S. 460 (2009).
30.
Id. at 472–73.
31.
Id. at 469–70 (citation omitted) (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001).
32.
See id. at 464, 469; Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. at
106–07.
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closed to all private expressive activity33—and abandon the “non-public
forum” label? No explanation was provided.
All that Alito said about First Amendment fora in Summum was
repeated the following year, in Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,34 and this time it was not dictum.35
But, in 2015, in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate
Veterans, Inc.,36 the non-public forum reappeared!37 The Court held that the
words or symbols on a specialty license plate were government speech.38
For the majority, Justice Breyer rejected the argument that a specialty plate
was some kind of “forum for private speech.”39 In doing so, he bypassed the
usual practice of setting out the forum categories, instead simply rejecting, in
turn, the applicability of each category of forum—traditional, designated,
limited, and non-public.40
Had order, such as it was, thereby been restored? Perhaps, but one’s
confidence is further weakened by the fact that, the following year, Justice
Thomas, joined by Justice Alito in dissenting from a denial of certiorari,
made reference to “a limited public forum, also called a nonpublic forum.”41
So a legitimate question remains: How many forum categories are
there?

33.
E.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 672;
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47, 52 (1966) (Adderley pre-dated the Perry terminology,
but provides a clear example of a government property that had been opened to no one for
expressive purposes).
34.
561 U.S. 661 (2010).
35.
See id. at 679 n.11.
36.
135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
37.
See id. at 2252.
38.
Id. at 2246–47.
39.
Id. at 2250.
40.
Id. at 2250–51. Writing for four Justices in dissent, Justice Alito said:
What Texas has done by selling space on its license plates is to create
what we have called a limited public forum. It has allowed state property . . . to be
used by private speakers according to rules that the State prescribes. Under the
First Amendment, however, those rules cannot discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint. But that is exactly what Texas did here.

Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2262 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
41.
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cty., 136 S. Ct. 1022, 1022 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas observed that “[d]istinguishing between designated and
limited public forums has proved difficult,” and that the guidance provided by the Supreme
Court on this point “has bedeviled federal courts.” Id.
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THEORETICAL DISARRAY IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS

Since 2010, federal appellate courts have remarkably, but
understandably, exhibited considerable confusion regarding the number of
public forum categories.42 In some circuits, panels continued to adhere to the
pre-Summum list of three categories—traditional, designated, and nonpublic43—as though the Supreme Court had said nothing that mattered in
Summum or Christian Legal Society.44 Opinions from other circuits,
variously and inconsistently, set forth either those three categories;45 all four
categories;46 the three categories identified in Summum and Christian Legal
Society;47 or those three categories, specifically said to be public fora, along
with a separately-identified apparently sui generis type of government
property, the “non-public forum.”48
42.
See id.
43.
Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1157–58 (D.C. Cir. 2015) cert. denied,
136 S.Ct. 2009 (2016) (decided post-Walker, but not citing it); Sons of Confederate Veterans,
Va. Div. v. City of Lexington, 722 F.3d 224, 229–30 (4th Cir. 2013); Am. Freedom Def.
Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp., 698 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 2012);
Satawa v. Macomb Cty. Rd. Comm’n, 689 F.3d 506, 517–18 (6th Cir. 2012); McGlone v.
Bell, 681 F.3d 718, 732 (6th Cir. 2012);, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2009 (2016); Oberwetter v.
Hilliard, 639 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Mass.
Bay Transp. Auth., 781 F.3d 571, 578 (1st Cir. 2015); Minn. Majority v. Mansky, 708 F.3d
1051, 1057 (8th Cir. 2013) (each asking whether a transportation authority’s advertising
program was a designated or non-public forum). Opinions in which the term “non-public
forum” is used, without any list of categories, include International Society for Krishna
Consciousness of California, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 764 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2014);
United States v. Szabo, 760 F.3d 997 (9th Cir. 2014); and K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono
Mountain School District, 710 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2013).
44.
See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of
the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S.
460, 481 (2009).
45.
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 2011);
Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 653 F.3d
290, 295 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Martinez, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11).
46.
Wright v. Incline Vill. Gen. Improvement Dist., 665 F.3d 1128, 1134 (9th
Cir. 2011) (citing Martinez, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11; Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998)).
47.
Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 2011); Bloedorn v. Grube,
631 F.3d 1218, 1230 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Newton v. LePage, 700 F.3d 595, 602 (1st Cir.
2012) (rejecting the applicability of those three categories, with no mention of the non-public
forum).
48.
Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir. 2012); Miller v. City
of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 535 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010). In Kaahumanu, the court actually said
this: “The Supreme Court has divided public forums into three categories: ‘[T]raditional
public forums,’ ‘designated public forums,’ and ‘limited public forums.’ The rest of
government property is either a non-public forum or no forum at all.” Kaahumanu, 682 F.3d
at 799 (citing Martinez, 561 U.S. at 679 n.11); see also Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678.
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The Second Circuit has consistently identified four categories.49 The
Tenth Circuit has also done so, but, somewhat oddly, has listed the original
three major Perry categories first, adding that the Supreme Court “has since
identified a separate category—the ‘limited public forum’—although the
Court’s use of this term has been inconsistent,”50 despite the fact that the
limited public forum made its first appearance in Perry.51 Even more oddly,
the same court went on to observe that “‘the boundary between a designated
public forum for a limited purpose . . . and a limited public forum . . . is far
from clear.’”52 The Seventh Circuit has also treated the limited public forum
as less than a full-fledged member of the family of forum categories, listing
the three established categories and then adding: “Some decisions recognize
a fourth category, variously called a ‘limited designated public forum’ . . . a
‘limited public forum,’ or a ‘limited forum.’”53
A different Seventh Circuit panel had earlier equated the limited and
non-public categories, asserting that “[a] limited public forum—sometimes
called a ‘non-public forum’—is a place the government has opened only for
specific purposes or subjects. . . .”54 Other circuits have also equated the two
concepts.55 In the Third,56 Eighth,57 and Ninth58 Circuits, there are,

49.
Children First Found., Inc. v. Fiala, 790 F.3d 328, 339 (2d Cir.), reh’g
granted, 611 F. App’x 741 (2d Cir. 2015); Ochshorn ex rel. R.O. v. Ithaca City Sch. Dist., 645
F.3d 533, 539 (2d Cir. 2011); Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 613 F.3d 336, 341–
42 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); see also Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d
30, 36 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding a public school to be a limited public forum, with no reference
to any other categories).
50.
Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1128 (10th Cir. 2012)
(emphasis added); see also Verlo v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1129 n.6 (10th Cir. 2016).
51.
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47
(1983); Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 622 F.3d 524, 535 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing the
Summum decision as having “resolve[d] the confusion over terminology . . . after the Supreme
Court first articulated the concept of a ‘limited public forum’ in Good News Club”).
52.
Doe, 667 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 916
n.14 (10th Cir. 1997)).
53.
Women’s Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp., 826 F.3d
947, 951 (7th Cir. 2016). Judge Posner provided no citations supporting the use of the first or
third of those terms, which this author has never encountered anywhere else. See id.
54.
Milestone v. City of Monroe, 665 F.3d 774, 783 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011). But
in his later Women’s Health Link opinion, Judge Posner defined “designated public forum” as
“a facility that the government has created to be, or has subsequently opened for use as, a site
for expressive activity. Usually, . . . ‘designated forums’ are available for specified forms of
private expressive activity or at specified times . . . . Such limitations are permitted.”
Women’s Health Link, Inc., 826 F.3d at 951.
55.
See NAACP v. City of Phila., 834 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2016); Powell v.
Noble, 798 F.3d 690, 699 (8th Cir. 2015); Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign v. King Cty.,
781 F.3d 489, 496 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015); Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry Found. v. Lee’s
Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 640 F.3d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 2011).

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

9

Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2

230

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

accordingly, only three forum categories, because the “limited” and “nonpublic” fora are viewed—albeit a bit tentatively—as one and the same.59
The Third Circuit’s pronouncement on the point is worth quoting:
There appears to be some inconsistency in federal courts’
opinions, even those of the Supreme Court, as to whether a limited
public forum is a separate category or a subset of a designated
public forum with a third category of forums being “non-public
forums.” Recently, the Court has used the term “limited public
forum” interchangeably with “non-public forum,” thus suggesting
that these categories of forums are the same. Because the
continued existence vel non of a “non-public forum” category has
no bearing in this case, we need not dwell on the possible
60
distinction between limited public forums and nonpublic forums.

Similarly the Ninth Circuit, guided by Christian Legal Society, set
forth the traditional, designated, and limited categories, observing, with
respect to limited public fora, that “in past cases they’ve sometimes been
labeled ‘non-public’ forums.”61
But less than a month later, a Ninth Circuit panel stated that, in light
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Walker, “the proper term likely is ‘non-

56.
See City of Phila., 834 F.3d at 441. “The final category is sometimes
called a limited public forum and other times labeled a non-public forum.” Id. The court
went on to “assume, without deciding, that the [district] [c]ourt was correct” in “conclud[ing]
that the advertising space [at issue was] a limited public/non-public forum.” Id. at 442
(citation omitted).
57.
See Powell, 798 F.3d at 699; Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry
Found., 640 F.3d at 334. “A limited public forum, like a non-public forum, may be ‘limited to
use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects,’ and the public
entity ‘may impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.’” Victory
Through Jesus Sports Ministry Found., 640 F.3d at 334–35 (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11
(2010)).
58.
See Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign, 781 F.3d at 496 n.2.
59.
See City of Phila., 834 F.3d at 441; Powell, 798 F.3d at 699; Seattle
Mideast Awareness Campaign, 781 F.3d at 496 n.2; Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry
Found., 640 F.3d at 334.
60.
Galena v. Leone, 638 F.3d 186, 197 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
The court added, “[w]e have stated that ‘we have generally applied to limited public fora the
constitutional requirements applicable to designated public fora.’ In light of Pleasant Grove,
this statement may no longer be good law.” Id. at 198 n.9 (citations omitted); see also
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 461, 469–70 (2009).
61.
Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign, 781 F.3d at 496 n.2. The Court
added that “[t]he label doesn’t matter, because the same level of First Amendment scrutiny
applies to all forums that aren’t traditional or designated public forums.” Id.
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public forum.’”62 Indeed, one might reasonably expect that, given Justice
Breyer’s recognition of four categories of forum in Walker,63 all prior
semantic confusion will be dispelled.64 But a few months later, yet another
Ninth Circuit panel reverted, without explanation, to a list of three categories
that included the limited public forum—but not the non-public forum.65
Given the fact that some courts appeared to be uninfluenced by the language
used by the Court in Summum and Christian Legal Society,66 along with the
propensity of courts to keep quoting from their own precedents, Walker will
probably not signal the end of judicial inconsistency in the listing of forum
categories.
V.

MAKING SENSE OF THE CATEGORIES

In a very recent Seventh Circuit opinion, Judge Posner made this
surprising and somewhat cryptic comment: “[I]t is rather difficult to see
what work ‘forum analysis’ in general does.”67 Is he right?68 I would
suggest, more modestly, that it is difficult to see what is accomplished by
having three or four forum categories, particularly if, as it now appears, two
of them are deemed to be essentially synonymous.69
Let us first consider, then, whether it makes any sense to evaluate a
speech restriction in a limited public forum just as we would evaluate such a
restriction in a non-public forum. Start by recognizing that, stray judicial
pronouncements to the contrary notwithstanding70, the boundaries of the two
62.
Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. King Cty., 796 F.3d 1165, 1169 n.1 (9th
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1022 (2016).
63.
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239,
2248–51 (2015).
64.
See id.
65.
See Reza v. Pearce, 806 F.3d 497, 502 (9th Cir.), reh’g denied, 2015 U.S.
App. LEXIS 20118 (9th Cir. 2015).
66.
See supra text accompanying note 43.
67.
Women’s Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp., 826 F.3d
947, 951 (7th Cir. 2016).
68.
I took the position, earlier, that the doctrine made presumptive sense.
Rohr, supra note 1, at 349 50.
69.
In my earlier article, I boldly asked, “how any reasonable jurist could
believe that, in a scheme apparently comprising four categories, two of them—one labeled
‘limited’ and one labeled ‘non’—are to be treated as exactly the same.” Rohr, supra note 1, at
334.
70.
See supra text accompanying notes 54–61. Consider also judicial
definitions of “non-public forum” that tend to conflate the two categories, such as this: “The
third category–the “nonpublic forum”–consists of government-owned facilities . . . that could
be and sometimes are used for private expressive activities but are not primarily intended for
such use.” Women’s Health Link, Inc. v. Fort Wayne Pub. Transp. Corp., 826 F.3d 947, 951
(7th Cir. 2016). But Judge Posner clearly meant to distinguish this third category from a
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categories are not precisely coterminous—which is why it made sense to
identify them originally as two different categories.71 Courts—including the
Supreme Court—have often applied the “non-public” label to government
properties that were, in fact, opened to some speakers for expressive
activity,72 but a non-public forum might also be a venue that had never been
so opened.73
Still, might it make sense to treat them similarly? It might. Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Arkansas Educational Television Commission
v. Forbes74 paves the way toward this conclusion. While that opinion
perpetuated existing doctrinal confusion in some respects,75 it provided some
helpful guidelines as well. Kennedy never used the term “limited public
forum” in this opinion, instead describing a non-public forum—by way of
distinguishing it from a designated public forum—as if it were a limited
forum.76 His key statement, made after discussing some earlier precedents,
was this:
These cases illustrate the distinction between “general
access,” which indicates the property is a designated public forum,
and “selective access,” which indicates the property is a nonpublic forum. . . . [T]he government does not create a designated
public forum when it does no more than reserve eligibility for
access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose
77
members must then, as individuals, “obtain permission” to use it.

The “non-public forum” label was thus correlated with “selective
access,” despite the facts that: (a) the non-public category was originally
described as encompassing venues that were not intended as First
Amendment fora at all,78 and (b) selective access would seem to be an
intrinsic feature of a limited forum.79 Now that the Supreme Court has
fourth, the “limited public forum.”
71.
See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990); Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
72.
See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730; Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
73.
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680
(1992); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41–42 (1966).
74.
523 U.S. 666 (1998).
75.
See Rohr, supra note 1, at 320–25.
76.
See id. at 693 n.18; Rohr, supra note 1, at 327.
77.
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679 (citations omitted).
78.
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46
(1983). Justice White, in Perry Educucation Association, introduced the third category—soon
known as the non-public forum—as “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation
a forum for public communication.” Id.
79.
See id. at 46 n.7, 48.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol41/iss2/2

12

Rohr: First Amendment Fora Revisited: How Many Categories Are There?

2017]

FIRST AMENDMENT FORA REVISITED

233

repeatedly stated that both labels lead to the same judicial analysis,80 whether
the forum is closed to all (for expressive purposes) or open to some (on a
selective basis with permission still required) the merger appears complete.
Given that the existence of a designated public forum has always
been all about the government’s intent to make it so,81 this arguably makes
sense; neither “no access for any speakers,” nor “access for some speakers
with permission required” is consistent with an intent to open the forum to
speakers.82 Justice Kennedy went on, in Forbes, to supply a policy reason
for making “general” versus “selective” access the governing distinction.83
By taking this approach, he wrote, “we encourage the government to open its
property to some expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-ornothing choice, it might not open the property at all.”84
The “mystery of the limited public forum,” of which I complained
several years ago, is thus solved, albeit without the help of a clear
explanation by the Supreme Court: Rather than being a sub-set of the
designated public forum, as first appeared,85 the limited public forum turns
out to be a non-identical twin of the non-public forum.86 But why continue
to use two different labels?
80.
See supra text accompanying notes 31 and 34. The two-part test—
reasonableness and the absence of viewpoint discrimination—linked, in Summum and
Martinez, to the limited public forum is of course the same test that applied to non-public fora
from the outset. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679, 679 n.11 (2010); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S.
460, 469–70 (2009).
81.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985).
82.
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 52–53.
This understanding is consistent with, and helps explain, this otherwise odd statement made
by Justice O’Connor in her plurality opinion in Kokinda, referring to a post office sidewalk to
which some speakers had been granted access: “Even conceding that the forum here has been
dedicated to some First Amendment uses, and thus is not a purely nonpublic forum, under
Perry, regulation . . . would still require application of the reasonableness test.” Kokinda, 497
U.S. at 730.
83.
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 680.
84.
Id.
85.
See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry Educ. Ass’n 460 U.S. at 46 n.7;
Rohr, supra note 1, at 306. What appears to be Justice White’s definition of a limited public
forum, presented for the first time in Perry Educ. Ass’n, was set forth in a footnote that sprang
from his discussion of the category that soon came to be known as “the public forum created
by government designation,” thereby suggesting that “limited” was a subset of “designated.”
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. See also this statement, in
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc.: “The second category of public property is the designated public forum,
whether of a limited or unlimited character . . . .” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
86.
Rohr, supra note 1, at 300.
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THE RIGHT TERMINOLOGY

If the two categories were to be consolidated as one, what should
that category be called? One could simply do what several courts have
recently done—namely, to use one of the two terms and quickly add that it is
sometimes called the other,87 but that is an unsatisfying solution because,
again, the two terms are really not synonymous.88 Is there a better phrase
that accurately includes: (a) government properties that are not open to any
speakers and (b) those that are open only to some? Quite frankly, I cannot
think of one.
But the phrase “non-public forum,” while awkward and misleading
from the very beginning,89 might be serviceable—preferably with two
hyphens—i.e., “non-public-forum”—if understood as denoting that a
government property, having been consistently off limits to all private
expression, is not a “forum” at all.90 And that might be expanded to include
“selective-access” fora that, legally, do not trigger the higher levels of
judicial scrutiny that apply in “traditional” public fora. The “limited public
forum” label could thus be eliminated. Limited and non-public fora would
therefore be lumped together, and defined simply by what they are not.
Meanwhile, at the other end of the spectrum, are there really two
categories of general-access fora? Specifically, does the designated public
forum—consistently acknowledged by the Supreme Court, and on every
court’s list of categories—truly exist? One can argue that, logically, it does
not, because it is defined as a government property that has been
intentionally opened for general access by private speakers;91 as long as that
87.
Milestone v. City of Monroe, 665 F.3d 774, 783 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011); see
also NAACP v. City of Phila., 834 F.3d 435, 441 (3d Cir. 2016); Powell v. Noble, 798 F.3d
690, 699 (8th Cir. 2015); Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry Found. v. Lee’s Summit R-7
Sch. Dist., 640 F.3d 329, 334 (8th Cir. 2011).
88.
See supra text accompanying notes 71–73.
89.
See Rohr, supra note 1, at 302. As I observed in my earlier article:
“Because we are dealing, by definition, with public and not private property, the term
[‘non-public forum’] is something of a misnomer. It would be more accurate to speak, in such
a case, of a ‘public non-forum’ . . . .” Id. at 302 n.10.
90.
See Powell, 798 F.3d at 699; Milestone, 665 F.3d at 783 n.3. Concededly,
I cannot confidently cite any judicial decision as clearly supporting this understanding. Note,
too, that Justice Kennedy, in his majority opinion in the Forbes case, cryptically introduced
the third forum category thusly: “Other government properties are either non-public fora or
not fora at all.” Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998). That
statement was quoted, still without any explanation, in Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789,
800 (9th Cir. 2012). I point this out simply to show that the concept of “not [a] forum at all”
has been taken seriously but (a) apparently conceived of as something other than a nonpublic forum, yet (b) never explained.
91.
See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679.
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description fits the property, speech restrictions are subject to strict or
intermediate judicial scrutiny.92 But the government actor in charge of the
property is not obligated to maintain its general-access policy, and as soon as
it denies a speaker access to the property, has it not switched to a policy of
selective access, thereby throwing the venue into the non-public forum
category?93 The designated forum would therefore seem capable of existing,
but only as a utopian place in which, by definition, no occasion for litigation
would ever arise; conflict immediately ends the property’s “designated”
status. The category could therefore be eliminated.
But, notwithstanding this logic, courts other than the Supreme
Court have held government properties to be designated public fora.94 The
unspoken explanation of such a holding, which would seem necessary to
render it consistent with prevailing forum theory, is that the government’s
primary intention is to allow general access to speakers, the exclusion of the
challenger thereby being viewed as somehow aberrational.95
Could the “traditional” and “designated” categories be usefully
combined into one? In fact, that consolidation was suggested by Justice
White’s initial identification of (what quickly came to be known as) the
traditional public forum, back in 1983 in Perry; that “first” category was
described as comprising “places which by long tradition or by government
fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate . . . .”96 The coupling of
tradition and government fiat, however, did not last long; “traditional” public
fora have been defined largely by historical practice,97 without regard for the
92.
See supra note 9.
93.
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,
825 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). My argument corresponds to that put forth by Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion—which was highly critical of
the Court’s emerging public forum rules—in Cornelius. Id. Notably, Blackmun, throughout
this opinion, referred to the “limited public forum” rather than the “designated public forum,”
clearly viewing a “limited” forum as presumptively open to speakers. See id.
94.
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Va. Div. v. City of Lexington, 722 F.3d
224, 230 (4th Cir. 2013); Doe, 667 F.3d at 1128–30; Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1234
(11th Cir. 2011); Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006); Justice for All v.
Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 769 (5th Cir. 2005); Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th
Cir. 2001).
95.
In the words of Professor Post, criticizing Cornelius in 1987: “There is
only one way out of this vicious circle, and it is not very satisfactory. It would require the
Court to distinguish between the intent to include the class of speakers or subjects of which
the plaintiff is the representative, and the intent to exclude the plaintiff.” Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1757 (1987).
96.
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
97.
See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678–79 (1992). “These precedents foreclose the conclusion that airport terminals are public
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government’s intent, while “government fiat” seems pretty clearly to
correlate with the governmental intent needed to establish a “designated”
forum. But the fact that the two concepts did make their debut in tandem
supports the possibility of reuniting them, under the singular heading of the
“open” public forum—the openness of which could be established either by
historical practice or governmental intent. But the availability—at least in
theory—of two separate paths to openness leads to the conclusion that the
two separate labels—“traditional” and “designated”—might as well be
retained.
VII.

CONCLUSION

So how many public forum categories do we really have? From a
practical standpoint, there are really only two options: Either the forum is
open—by virtue of either tradition or designation—in which case the higher
levels of judicial scrutiny apply, or it is not, in which case the more
deferential judicial analysis is employed.98 But four labels remain in use,
although the growing and prevailing view seems to be that two of those
labels—“limited” and “non”—are now synonymous. It truly appeared, two
or three decades ago, that the “limited” forum was a viable, non-redundant
category of its own, but there has been scant support for that understanding
in recent years. For the sake of clarity, that label should now be abandoned,
preferably via a clear and explicit judicial pronouncement that will make
speculative queries such as this little essay unnecessary.

fora. . . . [T]he tradition of airport activity does not demonstrate that airports have historically
been made available for speech activity.” Id. at 680.
The standard pronouncement is that streets, sidewalks, and parks are traditional
public fora, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726–27 (1990), and the implication
appears to be that those are the only properties worthy of inclusion in the category, but courts
have at times stretched to pin the “traditional” label on other kinds of government property
that are seen as sufficiently similar to streets, sidewalks, and parks. E.g., ACLU of Nev. v.
City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (publicly-owned pedestrian
mall); Pouillon v. City of Owosso, 206 F.3d 711, 715–17 (6th Cir. 2000) (city hall steps).
98.
Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. at 678–79 (1992);
Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726; Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45–46.
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